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I. INTRODUCTION
Through the abuse of offshore tax havens, the United
States loses roughly $100 billion in tax revenue annually.'
Frustrated with this revenue loss, the Internal Revenue Service
(IRS) and the Department of Justice (DOJ) have pressured
Switzerland, a well-known tax haven, to be more cooperative with
American tax collection efforts, resulting in controversial
settlement agreements 2 between the United States and Switzerland
and the United States and the Union Bank of Switzerland (UBS),3
Switzerland's largest bank." The United States may be
emboldened by this success and pursue similar efforts to reduce
tax avoidance by American customers in other tax haven
jurisdictions. In early 2009, the DOJ announced that UBS had
entered a deferred prosecution agreement with the DOJ and the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) whereby UBS
agreed to provide the IRS with the names of American citizens
holding offshore accounts that meet certain specified criteria in
order to avoid charges of "conspiring to defraud the United States
by impeding the Internal Revenue Service."'
1. STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, 100TH CONG., TAX HAVEN BANKS
AND U.S. TAX COMPLIANCE 1 (2008) [hereinafter U.S. TAX COMPLIANCE].
2. Daniel Pruzin, Swiss Court Orders UBS to Notify Clients Before Turning
Account Details Over to U.S., BNA BANKING DAILY, Sept. 25, 2009, http://lawlib
proxy2.unc.edu:2061/bdln/ (search "Swiss Court Orders UBS to Notify Clients
Before Turning Account Details Over to U.S.") [hereinafter UBS to Notify Clients].
3. See Deferred Prosecution Agreement at Exhibit C p. 1, United States v. UBS
AG, No. 09-60033-CR-COHN (S.D. Fla., Feb. 18, 2009) [hereinafter Deferred
Prosecution Agreement] ("UBS provides banking, wealth management, asset
management and investment banking services....")
4. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, UBS Enters Into Deferred Prosecution
Agreement (Feb. 18, 2009), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2009/February/09-tax-13
6.html [hereinafter U.S. Dep't of Justice].
5. U.S. Dep't of Justice, supra note 4; accord, UBS Agrees to Reveal U.S. Tax
Shelter Clients, WEBCPA.cOM, Feb. 19, 2009, http://www.web cpa.com/news/30782-
1.html (describing UBS Agreement with the DOJ).
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The recent changes in the interpretation of Swiss bank
secrecy laws, as evidenced by the Deferred Prosecution
Agreement with UBS, will likely cause: (1) irreparable harm to
Swiss banking industry; (2) virtual elimination of tax avoidance
techniques previously available to American depositors in Swiss
banks; and (3) greater tax revenues for the U.S. government.6 Part
II of this Note will introduce the UBS investigation as it relates to
the loss of tax revenue in the United States. Part III will compare
Swiss bank secrecy laws with American bank secrecy laws and
specifically address how the Swiss laws have made Switzerland,
like several other offshore tax havens, attractive to American
customers. Part IV will explore the evolution of Swiss bank
secrecy in the UBS investigation.9 Part V will examine the effects
of the new interpretations of the Swiss secrecy laws, expanding on
the potential harm to the Swiss banking industry and how these
new interpretations will affect American clients.1° Part VI will
discuss the recent developments regarding the agreement between
the United States and Switzerland, address how the Swiss courts
reacted to the agreement, and analyze the options available to the
Swiss for future compliance with the original agreement."
II. THE UBS INVESTIGATION
A. Tax Havens
There are two alternative ways to determine if a country
constitutes a tax haven: the objective approach and the subjective
approach.12 The objective approach defines a tax haven as "any
nation which has no tax or a low rate of tax on all or certain
categories of income and which offers a certain level of banking or
6. See infra Part V, pp. 454-58.
7. See infra Part II, pp. 436-41.
8. See infra Part III, pp. 441-48.
9. See infra Part IV, pp. 448-54.
10. See infra Part V, pp. 454-58.
11. See infra Part VI, pp. 458-65. This information is current as of Feb. 1, 2010.
12. Douglas J. Workman, Comment, The Use of Offshore Tax Havens for the
Purpose of Criminally Evading Income Taxes, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 675,
678 (1982).
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commercial secrecy."13 A nation is a subjective tax haven "if it
promotes itself as one, and those who specialize in international
tax planning consider it to be one., 14 Switzerland is a tax haven
under both the objective and subjective approach because it
requires strict bank confidentiality, promotes itself as an expert in
the banking industry and enables Americans to invest assets in the
country without paying taxes. 5
The strict secrecy laws and the expertise of the Swiss in the
banking industry make Switzerland an attractive tax haven for
American investors. According to the 2008 Senate Subcommittee
Report on Tax Havens, UBS alone has "maintain[ed] for an
estimated 19,000 U.S. clients 'undeclared' accounts in Switzerland
with billions of dollars in assets that have not been disclosed to
U.S. tax authorities."' 6 The ease with which Americans can hide
assets in offshore accounts hinders the U.S. government's ability to
enforce its tax laws effectively.
B. Loss of Tax Revenue in the United States Through Use of
Offshore Tax Havens
American citizens may have close to $14.8 billion hidden in
Swiss bank accounts. 7 In May 2009, the Obama Administration
announced a plan to reform corporate taxation by strictly
enforcing laws against tax haven abuse in an effort to raise $8.7
billion in tax revenues. 8 The Administration's efforts to stop tax
haven abuse are necessary to increase tax revenues to decrease the
deficit and fund new programs. This increased effort to raise
money is not unusual, as "[t]ax-dodging schemes are increasingly
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. See id. Other countries that have been identified as tax havens include
Andorra, the Bahamas, Barbados, the Cayman Islands, Liechtenstein, Monaco,
Singapore, and Turkey. See id. at n16; ORG. FOR ECON. Co-OPERATION AND DEV.,
COUNTERING OFFSHORE TAX EVASION: SOME QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS, 12 (Sept.
28, 2009), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/23/13/42469606.pdf.
16. U.S. TAX COMPLIANCE, supra note 1, at 8.
17. Emma Thomasson, US Civil Case No Big Threat to UBS-Swiss Regulator,
REUTERS, Feb. 21, 2009, available at http://uk.reuters.com/article/idUKLL6137322009
0221.
18. The Last Days of Bank Secrecy?, PODER360.COM, Sept., 2009, http://www.po
der360.com/article-detail.php?id-article=2496.
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under attack by governments scrambling to find revenue needed to
finance the soaring costs of government stimulus programmes."'1 9
Tax haven abuse is an essential part of reform, as the United
States loses more than $100 billion of tax revenue annually due to
abuse of offshore tax havens.20  President Obama said, "[i]f
financial institutions won't cooperate with us, we will assume that
they are sheltering money in tax havens, and act accordingly.,
21
One analyst has suggested that decreasing tax evasion
through offshore tax havens is "essential for President Obama's
rescue effort to retain public support and credibility., 22  Tax
evasion is considered "grossly unfair" 3 at any time to those in the
lower, middle, and upper-middle classes because only they must
pay taxes while the wealthy are able to hide assets offshore to
avoid paying. While it is unfair at any time, critics argue that tax
evasion "should be intolerable" in times of financial crisis.24
Curbing tax evasion, which is primarily promulgated by the
wealthy, is a way for President Obama to maintain public support
while he is trying to usher in significant legislative reform. Obama
can garner such public support for expensive social programs by
making the wealthy pay taxes that directly fund such proposed
programs.
C. Investigation into UBS: Events Creating Suspicion in the
Bank
UBS has developed a substantial business enabling
American clients to hide assets and evade taxation on the resulting
investment income.25  The Senate launched an investigation in
19. Thomasson, supra note 17.
20. U.S. TAX COMPLIANCE, supra note 1, at 1.
21. The Last Days of Bank Secrecy?, supra note 18.
22. Editorial, $100 Billion the Country Could Use, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2009, at
A20, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/14/opinion/14satl.html?_r=1.
23. Id.
24. Id.; see, e.g., Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Banca Della Svizzera Italiana, 92 F.R.D.
111, 117, 32 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 1650, 1657 (1981) (explaining that using secret foreign
bank accounts has "debilitating effects" on Americans and the American economy).
25. See U.S. TAX COMPLIANCE, supra note 1, at 11 ("These facts indicate that,
soon after it joined the [Qualified Intermediary] program [in 2001], UBS helped its
U.S. clients structure their Swiss accounts to avoid reporting billions of dollars in
assets to the IRS."); SEC, UBS Agrees to Pay $200 Million to Settle SEC Charges for
438 [Vol. 14
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2003, followed by a criminal investigation by the DOJ in 2004, into
UBS's involvement in tax shelters.26 The investigation delved into
substantial records of the taxpayers and their interaction with
UBS, adding scrutiny to other activities of UBS.
27
In 2001, UBS signed an agreement with the United States
to be a part of the U.S. Qualified Intermediary Program which
"encourage[s] foreign financial institutions to report and withhold
tax on U.S. source income paid to foreign bank accounts."" UBS
21never filed the requisite reporting forms to the IRS, however. In
2003, the IRS launched a three-month long Voluntary Disclosure
Initiative whereby American taxpayers could voluntarily disclose
their use of offshore credit cards, many of which were set up by
UBS. 0  Due to continued heightened scrutiny of UBS's
involvement, the IRS and the DOJ focused on any and all
activities of UBS with American taxpayers in which American
taxpayers could be evading income tax.
The arrest and indictment of Bradley Birkenfeld in April
2008 reignited the investigation into UBS.3' The DOJ charged
Birkenfeld, a former private banker and an American, for
conspiring with another American citizen "to defraud the IRS of
$7.2 million in taxes owed. ' , 32  The United States alleged that
Birkenfeld traveled to the United States to market U.S. securities
to American clients, which requires a license that UBS did not
Violating Registration Requirements, SEC Litigation Release No. 20905 (D.D.C. filed
Feb. 18, 2009) ("As alleged in the SEC's complaint, from at least 1999 through 2008,
UBS acted as an unregistered broker-dealer and investment adviser to thousands of
U.S. persons and offshore entities with United States citizens as beneficial owners.").
26. See U.S. S., PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, U.S. TAX SHELTER
INDUSTRY: THE ROLE OF ACCOUNTANTS, LAWYERS AND FINANCIAL PROFESSIONALS
(2003) [hereinafter Role of Accountants].
27. See id.
28. U.S. TAX COMPLIANCE, supra note 1, at 3, 9, 21-22.
29. Id. at 9 (explaining that UBS defended this claim by stating that "these U.S.
client accounts fall outside its [Qualified Intermediary] reporting obligations.").
30. See generally Press Release, Internal Revenue Service, Statement by Treas.
Ass't Sec'y For Tax Policy Pam Olsen, Early Data Show Strong Response to
Offshore Initiative; Applicants Owe Millions, Reveal Scores of Promoters (May 1,
2003), http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=109351,00.html.
31. U.S. TAX COMPLIANCE, supra note 1, at 2.
32. Id.; see also, 18 U.S.C.A. § 371 (2009) (provides that when two or more
persons conspire to commit an offense or defraud the United States for any purpose,
each person can be fined or imprisoned up to five years, or both).
20101
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have.33 Birkenfeld pled guilty to conspiracy and agreed to provide
testimony to the Senate Subcommittee on Investigations for
insight into the business operations of UBS. 34 In his testimony,
Birkenfeld indicated that "UBS in Switzerland had '$20 billion of
assets under management in the United States undeclared




The information obtained from Birkenfeld's disclosures
was the "crucial factor leading to the criminal investigation of
UBS."36 Kevin Downing, the DOJ prosecutor who handled the
UBS case stated, "[w]ithout Mr. Birkenfeld walking into the door
of the Department of Justice in summer of 2007, I doubt this
massive fraud scheme would have been discovered by the United
States government., 37 In August 2009, a U.S. District Court judge
sentenced Birkenfeld to forty months in prison, a sentence that
was "10 months longer than was recommended by prosecutors., 3s
The United States may request information in a "John
Doe" summons to "obtain information about possible tax fraud by
people whose identities are unknown."39  In July 2008, the IRS
33. Indictment at 3, United States v. Bradley Birkenfeld and Mario Staggl, No. 08-
60099 (S.D. Fla., April 10, 2008); see also U.S. TAX COMPLIANCE, supra note 1
(explaining that the evidence shows that multiple Swiss UBS bankers were involved
in such activities that were not only against U.S. law but also the bank's own
policies).
34. U.S. TAX COMPLIANCE, supra note 1, at 2, 9 (noting that his testimony was
provided as part of his agreement to plead guilty to the charges).
35. Id. at 10.
36. Lynnley Browning, Ex-UBS Banker Seeks Billions for Blowing Whistle, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 26, 2009, at B1 (explaining that, in 2007, Birkenfeld came forward
seeking a multi-billion-dollar reward under a new whistle-blower law, though his
recent conviction may hinder his ability to collect). Because Birkenfeld came
forward before the DOJ, IRS, or SEC learned of the scheme he is still entitled to
benefit from the whistle-blower law. Id. Birkenfeld's attorney represents that, at the
time of his arrest, he "was already cooperating extensively" with federal authorities.
Martha Brannigan, Whistle-Blower Advocates Seek Review of Former UBS Banker's
Treatment, MIAMI HERALD, Nov. 28, 2009, http://www.miamiherald.com/business/
story/1355297.
37. Ex-UBS Banker Seeks Billions for Blowing Whistle, supra note 36.
38. Joanna Chung, Former UBS Banker Given Prison Term, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 21,
2009, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/34cO2bcc-8e86-llde-87d0-OOl44feabdcO.html?nclick_
check=l.
39. Press Release, U.S. Department of Justice, Justice Department Asks Court to
Serve IRS Summons for UBS Swiss Bank Account Records (June 30, 2008)
[hereinafter Justice Department Asks Court].
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issued John Doe summonses 4° demanding that UBS provide the
names of American taxpayers "who may be using Swiss bank
accounts to evade federal income taxes, 41 or perpetrating
"activities intended to conceal from the IRS the identities of
UBS's United States clients, who willfully evaded their income tax
obligations. 42 According to a 2008 Senate Subcommittee Report
on Tax Havens, UBS opened accounts in Switzerland from as early
as 2000 through 2007 in a "concerted effort" to help American
clients evade payment of U.S. income taxes.43
III. BANK SECRECY LAWS PRIOR TO THE UBS INVESTIGATION
A. Offshore Tax Havens
The Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD)44 issued a list of factors used to identify tax
havens.45 In 2000, the OECD had a list of forty tax havens,46 thirty-
40. Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 3, at 9.
41. Justice Department Asks Court, supra note 39. The IRS investigation into
UBS's actions was not necessarily a novel move on the part of the IRS as it has
investigated offshore tax havens in an effort to curb tax evasion for many years.
Workman, supra note 12. In the 1960s and 1970s, the IRS initiated investigations
commonly referred to as "Operation Trade Winds," which focused on Americans
hiding assets in offshore havens such as the Bahamas. This project and others like it
were subsequently shut down because of Congressional investigations into possible
impropriety of the activities by the IRS. United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 279,
(1980); UBS Refuses to Disclose Tax Shelter Accounts, WEBCPA.coM, Mar. 5, 2009,
http://www.webcpa.com/news/30921-1.html (Democratic Senator Carl Levin from
Michigan suggests that the difference between the past relations with the Swiss
banks, in which U.S. investors hid assets to evade taxes without aid from the banks
themselves, and the current situation is that "here, Swiss bankers aided and abetted
violations of U.S. tax law by traveling to this country, with client code names,
encrypted computers, counter-surveillance training, and all the rest of it, to enable
U.S. residents to hide assets and money in Swiss accounts.").
42. Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 3, at Exhibit B, p. 4.
43. U.S. TAX COMPLIANCE, supra note 1, at 8.
44. James K. Jackson, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. REPORT FOR CONG., THE OECD
INITIATIVE ON TAX HAVENS, at 6 (July 24, 2009), http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/R4
0114 20090724.pdf. (As an intergovernmental organization with thirty member
countries, including both the United States and Switzerland, "the OECD has
addressed the issue of tax havens in various forms since the organization was formed
in 1961.").
45. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., supra note 15 (noting that these
factors include: (1) no or nominal tax on the relative income, (2) lack of effective
exchange of information, (3) lack of transparency, and (4) no requirement that the
activity be substantial) "No or nominal tax is not sufficient in itself to classify a
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five of which were deemed to be uncooperative. 4' By 2008,
however only three countries remained on the list of
uncooperative tax havens.4 This sharp decline was a direct result
of countries not wishing to be considered "uncooperative" by the
OECD and their agreeing to sign "Commitment Letters" to be
more cooperative in tax information exchange initiatives.49 In
2009, no countries were listed as "uncooperative tax havens."5 °
This does not mean, however, that offshore tax havens no longer
exist; it simply means that none of them have refused to comply
with the OECD's minimum standards.5'
B. Swiss Approach
The economic uncertainty resulting from World War I
caused widespread panic over the financial loss, inciting
individuals worldwide to invest their money in secure banks in
other nations, away from the reach of their home country."
During the 1930s, the Nazi regime sought to prevent the outflow of
capital from Germany by imposing strict regulations.53 The 1933
Nazi regulations stated "all German nationals [were required] to
declare assets held outside of Germany. 5 4 Holding foreign assets
was punishable by death.5 Switzerland reacted to the execution of
country as a tax haven... [t]hus, in order to avoid being listed as an uncooperative
tax haven, jurisdictions which met the criteria were asked only to make commitments
to implement the principles of transparency and exchange of information for tax
purposes." The last factor of "no substantial activity" was not considered in
determining whether a tax haven was "cooperative." Id.
46. Id.
47. U.S. TAX COMPLIANCE, supra note 1, at 27.
48. Id. (listing the countries as Andorra, Liechtenstein, and Monaco).
49. Id.
50. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., supra note 15.
51. See id. The OECD maintains a "gray list" of uncooperative tax havens as
well, removing Switzerland in September. Deborah Ball, Switzerland is Taken Off
List of Uncooperative Tax Havens, WALL ST. J., Sept. 26, 2009, A22 (Switzerland
signed a dozen double-taxation treaties in order to be taken off the list.).
52. Greg Brabec, Note & Comment, The Fight for Transparency: International
Pressure to Make Swiss Banking Procedures Less Restrictive, 21 TEMP. INT'L & COMP.
L.J. 231, 233 (2007).
53. Id.
54. C. Todd Jones, Compulsion Over Comity: The United States' Assault on
Foreign Bank Secrecy, 12 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 454, 455 (1992).
55. See, Brabec, supra note 52, at 233.
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three German citizens convicted of hiding money from the
German government by enacting strict banking secrecy laws in the
Swiss Federal Banking Act of 1934.56 The Banking Act of 1934
created a standard for the Swiss Federal Banking Commission to
have a "limited amount of supervision" over the banking
industry." To further protect investors, Swiss bankers chose to use
"Numbered Accounts" without names to protect those customers
who might be "threatened by political persecution.,
8
In Switzerland, the secrecy laws were created for the dual
purpose of "protect[ing] the national sovereignty of the Swiss
economy as well as the assets of bank customers."5 9 Accordingly,
the Banking Act of 1934 provides for criminal sanctions for
violations of the "banker's duty of confidence" 6 although it does
not define the scope of this duty. It has traditionally been viewed,
however, as similar to American attorney-client privilege. The
Banking Act of 1934 states:
Whomever divulges a secret entrusted to him in his
capacity as officer, employee, authorized agent,
liquidator or commissioner of a bank... or divulges
a secret of which he has become aware in this
capacity, and whomever tries to induce others to
violate professional secrecy shall be punished by a
prison term not to exceed six months or by a fine
not exceeding .. 50,000 [Swiss Francs]. 62
Swiss law provides for some exceptions to the strict bank
secrecy provisions. Swiss bankers can and, in some cases, are
56. Id.; accord Jennifer A. Mencken, Note, Supervising Secrecy: Preventing
Abuses Within Bank Secrecy and Financial Privacy Systems, 21 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L.
REv. 461, 468 (1998) (the secrecy laws also served the purpose of granting protection
to those who were at risk of the Nazi Gestapo seizing their assets.).
57. TAX AND TRADE GUIDE: SWITZERLAND 56 (Arthur Andersen & Co. 2d Ed.
1972) (1965) [hereinafter Tax and Trade Guide].
58. Id. at 57.
59. Brabec, supra note 52 at 234.
60. Micheloud & Cie, "Banking Act of 1934," http://switzerland.isyours.com/e/
banking/secrecy/banking.act.html.
61. Tax and Trade Guide, supra note 57 at 57.
62. Id. at 56 (citing Article 47 of the Swiss Banking Law of 1934).
2010]
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required to breach secrecy if the disclosure best serves the public
welfare.63  Other exceptions include carve-outs for legal
proceedings involving money laundering.64 Tax evasion is not
included in these exemptions65 because tax evasion is not a crime
in Switzerland.66 Swiss bank secrecy laws require that the crime for
which information is sought must also be a crime under Swiss law.67
Switzerland has entered into several international treaties
6
8
and enacted legislation limiting the scope of bank secrecy in
response to international pressure regarding conflicting tax law.69
These treaties have opened the door for investigations like that of
the IRS against UBS, allowing the United States to advance its
goal of transparency. Switzerland's desire to improve its
"tarnished image" 70 appears to be the biggest motivator for
entering into these treaties.71 Switzerland has entered into two
bilateral agreements with the United States: the Treaty on Mutual
Assistance in Criminal Matters (TMACM) in 1951; and the
Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect
to Taxes on Income (the Convention) in 1975.72
The TMACM provides that Swiss authorities73 must make
certain identifying information available to the United States that
63. Micheloud & Cie, supra note 60 (explaining that secrecy can be breached in
criminal cases with regards to money laundering and in civil cases regarding
bankruptcy and divorce, for example).
64. Id.
65. Brabec, supra note 52, at 235.
66. Tax and Trade Guide Switzerland, supra note 57, at 58.
67. E.g., Urs Martin Lauchli, Swiss Bank Secrecy With Comparative Aspects to the
American Approach, 42 ST. Louis L.J. 865, 873 (1998).
68. E.g., Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to
Taxes on Income, U.S.-Switz., May 24, 1951, 2 U.S.T. 1751 (ratified Sept. 27, 1951)
[hereinafter Double Taxation]; Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters,
U.S.-Switz, Dec. 23, 1975, 27 U.S.T. 2019 [hereinafter Mutual Assistance].
69. Brabec, supra note 52, at 237.
70. Michele Moser, Note, Switzerland: New Exceptions to Bank Secrecy Law
Aimed at Money Laundering and Organized Crime, 27 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 321,
327 (1995).
71. Beckett G. Cantley, The New Tax Information Exchange Agreement. A
Potent Weapon Against U.S. Tax Fraud?, 4 Hous. Bus. & TAX L.J. 231, 240 (2004).
72. Double Taxation, supra note 68; Mutual Assistance, supra note 68.
73. Mutual Assistance, supra note 68 at 33 (designating that the Swiss authority
responsible for assisting the United States is the Central Authority for Switzerland,




would assist in investigating and prosecuting an offense listed in
the treaty.74  The treaty requires Switzerland to provide
information that would traditionally violate the Swiss secrecy laws
under certain conditions, including:
a. the request concerns the investigation or
prosecution of a serious offense; b. the disclosure is
of importance for obtaining or proving facts which
are of substantial significance for the investigation
or proceeding; and c. reasonable but unsuccessful
efforts have been made in the United States to
75obtain the evidence or information in other ways.
Switzerland's obligation to cooperate is mitigated, however,
because it has the right under the TMACM to refuse to assist the
United States if it "considers that the execution of the request is
likely to prejudice its sovereignty, security or similar essential
interests., 76  This "general safeguarding clause" ensures that
Switzerland could "plead important interests" in order to refuse a
request of the United States.77 In the past, Switzerland has "been
diligent in rejecting generalized requests for information
concerning large groups of people, or 'fishing expeditions.'
78
Nonetheless, the TMACM includes a list of offenses that would
require obligatory cooperation between the two countries,
including crimes such as murder, rape, and fraud, but not including
tax evasion.79  Therefore, Switzerland can limit the effect of
TMCAM on tax evasion investigations because it can claim
protection against prejudice to sovereignty and national interests.
The Convention for the Avoidance Double Taxation
between the United States and Switzerland ensures an effective
information exchange to prevent fraud and to avoid both nations
"claiming the right to tax the same stream of income. '8° The
74. Id. at 6.
75. Id. at 17.
76. Id. at 7.
77. Lauchli, supra note 67, at 875.
78. Id. at 876.
79. Mutual Assistance, supra note 68, at 46-51.
80. Workman, supra note 12, at 687.
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Convention allows American and Swiss authorities to correspond
directly with each other to fulfill their obligations under the
Convention." It also allows the authorities to "prescribe
regulations necessary to carry [the Convention] into effect.,1
2
C. The American Approach
American laws protecting privacy of financial information
are more limited in scope than Swiss laws. 8' American banks must
collect customer information for "law enforcement and
prosecution purposes."" The Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit in United States v. Prevatt85 held that records submitted
voluntarily by banks to the IRS were admissible as evidence to
prove tax evasion despite claims of privilege.86
Congress passed the Bank Secrecy Act in 1970 in response
to "concern that foreign financial institutions in jurisdictions with
strict bank secrecy laws were being used to violate or evade U.S.
criminal, tax, and regulatory requirements. 8 7 The Act requires
American banks to maintain records that would "have a high
degree of usefulness in criminal, tax, or regulatory investigations
or proceedings," as promulgated by regulations from the Secretary
88of the Treasury. The Bank Secrecy Act also requires American
citizens to file reports about their relationships with foreign
financial institutions.89 While Swiss law 9° calls for civil and criminal
81. Double Taxation, supra note 68, art. XIX.
82. Id.
83. Brabec, supra note 52, at 237-38.
84. Id. at 238.
85. United States v. Prevatt, 526 F.2d 400 (5th Cir. 1976).
86. Id at 402-403 (The privilege asserted by the appellant in this case was a
"banker-depositor" privilege, which appellant claimed, "would not allow the
Government to use information against a depositor obtained from the bank without
the depositor's permission").
87. Lewis J. Saret et al., Viewpoint: The Report of Foreign Bank and Financial
Accounts: A Primer, BNA BANKING DAILY, Sept. 25, 2009.
88. 31 U.S.C.A. § 5311 (2009).
89. 31 C.F.R. § 103.24(a) (2009) ("Each person subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States... having a financial interest in, or signature or other authority over, a
bank, securities or other financial account in a foreign country shall report such
relationship to the Commissioner of the Internal Revenue for each year in which
such relationship exists.").
90. See supra pp. 442-44.
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penalties for bankers who violate their duty of confidence, the
Bank Secrecy Act calls for civil and criminal penalties for failure to
comply with the reporting requirements." If an individual
participates in an activity that a bank is required to report or
record, that bank must retain records for a period of five years.92
D. Difference in Approaches
Swiss secrecy laws conflict with American laws and the
IRS's practice of actively prosecuting tax evaders.93  The
fundamental difference is that tax evasion is a crime in the United
States, unlike in Switzerland. 94 Tax evasion is "an affirmative act"
including "any conduct, the likely effect of which would be to
mislead or to conceal." 95 Such conduct could include making false
statements to the Treasury or concealing sources of income or
96other assets. Criminal tax evasion results from "conduct that
entails deception, concealment, destruction of records and the
like." 97  To successfully prosecute parties for tax evasion, the
government must prove each of the following elements:
"willfulness, the existence of a tax deficiency, and an affirmative
act constituting evasion or attempted evasion of the tax."98 To
establish "willfulness," the government must "prove that the law
imposed a duty on the defendant, that the defendant knew of this
91. Tax and Trade Guide, supra note 57; 31 C.F.R. § 103.57 (2009) (civil penalty);
31 C.F.R. §103.59 (2009) (criminal penalty).
92. 31 C.F.R. § 103.32 (2009).
93. Compare Tax and Trade Guide, supra note 57, at 56, with 31 U.S.C.A. § 5311.
94. Brabec, supra note 52, at 235; see also 26 U.S.C.A. § 7201 (2009) ("Any
person who willfully attempts in any manner to evade or defeat any tax imposed by
this title or the payment thereof shall . . . be guilty of a felony and, upon conviction
thereof, shall be fined not more than $100,000 ($500,000 in the case of a corporation),
or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both, together with the costs of
prosecution.").
95. United States v. Josephberg, 562 F.3d 478, 490 (2d Cir. 2009), (citing United
States v. Klausner, 80 F.2d 55, 62 (2d Cir.1996)); see 26 U.S.C.A. § 7201.
96. Id.
97. William B. Barker, The Ideology of Tax Avoidance, 40 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 229,
242 (2009).
98. United States v. Beale, 574 F.3d 512, 517 (8th Cir. 2009), (citing United States
v. Marston, 517 F.3d 996, 999 n.2 (8' Cir. 2008)).
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duty, and that he voluntarily and intentionally violated that
duty.
,99
Switzerland employs a strict policy, known as the principle
of speciality, to determine when to release banking records in
connection with tax evasion investigations conducted by the
United States or other countries where tax evasion is a crime.' °°
Generally, the Swiss only release information and records if the
crime being investigated is also a crime under Swiss law and then
only to the extent that judicial assistance is authorized under Swiss
law.01 Since tax evasion is not a crime under Swiss law, the release
of records and information is not authorized under the speciality
principle and the relaxation of secrecy is not permitted.'0
IV. THE EVOLUTION OF Swiss BANK SECRECY IN THE UBS
INVESTIGATION
A. Swiss Bank Secrecy
1. Prosecution of UBS
In February of 2009, as part of an earlier agreement with
the IRS, UBS gave 255 names of U.S. citizens suspected of using
offshore accounts to evade taxes to the IRS.103  The IRS
subsequently initiated investigations against 150 of the 255
disclosed as part of the February settlement.1° By August 2009,
three of UBS's American customers pled guilty "to filing false tax
returns that failed to disclose the existence of their UBS Swiss
99. Id. (citing United States v. Barker, 556 F.3d 682, 687 (8th Cir. 2009)).
100. Brabec, supra note 62, at 254.
101. See id. at 251.
102. Id.
103. Haig Simonian, UBS and US Strike Tax Evasion Deal, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 12,
2009, available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/513bcb70-8748-llde-9280-00144feab
dc0.html.
104. Haig Simonian & Joanna Chung, UBS Deal Heralds New Era of Tax
Enforcement, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 19, 2009, available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/O/c57c
32d2-8cfl-llde-a540-00144feabdcO.html.
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bank accounts."' '° By November, seven people had been charged
criminally, "with at least two getting sentenced to prison time."'0
2. Entering Into a Deferred Prosecution Agreement
The Financial Market Supervisory Authority (FINMA),
the Swiss bank regulatory agency, issued the order for UBS to
provide the 4,450 account names to the Swiss Federal Tax
Administration, as stipulated in the Deferred Prosecution
Agreement' °7 UBS must also pay the United States $780 million
in "fines, penalties, interest and restitution., 10 8  UBS has also
agreed to suspend business with American residents, in accordance
with the Deferred Prosecution Agreement, and will now only offer
banking services to American residents "through subsidiaries or
affiliates registered to do business in the United States" ("Exit
Program").1 9
In exchange for this cooperation, the United States has
recommended that prosecution against UBS "be deferred for the
period of the longer of eighteen (18) months from the date of the
signing" of the Deferred Prosecution Agreement, the "resolution
of the 'John Doe' Summons," or upon the "completion of UBS's
105. Joanna Chung, 150 Clients of UBS Investigated, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 19, 2009,
available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/3e293f46-8c4c-llde-bl4f-00144feabdcO.html.
106. Slew of Offshore Tax Evaders Settle With IRS, MSNBC.COM, Nov. 17, 2009,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/33988899.
107. Deferred Prosecution Agreement supra note 3, at 6; see also, Simonian &
Chung, supra note 104; Settlement Agreement Concerning DOJ, IRS, SEC, and UBS
at 2, between U.S. and Switz., Aug. 19, 2009 availabe at http://www.ubs.com/l/Show
Media/index/crossborder/johndoesettlement?contentld=170419&name=UBSIRS_a
greement.pdf [hereinafter Settlement Agreement] (explaining that the basis for this
number is that an analysis conducted by UBS estimated that this will amount to
about 4,450 accounts to be reported by UBS to the Swiss Federal Tax
Administration).
108. U.S. Dep't of Justice, supra note 4; see also, Deferred Prosecution Agreement
supra note 3, at 3 (explaining that the $780 million includes $380 million "in
disgorgement of the profits from maintaining the United States cross-border business
from 2001 through 2008." Two hundred million of the $380 million will be paid
directly to the SEC as part of a Consent Order. The remaining $400 million will be
paid to the DOJ and the IRS for "federal backup withholding tax ... interest and
penalties; and restitution for unpaid taxes, together with interest thereon, for
undeclared United States taxpayers who were actively assisted or facilitated by UBS
private bankers.").
109. Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 3, at 4.
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'Exit Program."'. 0  After the eighteen-month period, if the U.S.
government is satisfied with UBS's compliance in all other
respects, it will seek dismissal, with prejudice, within thirty days of
the expiration of the eighteen-month period."' The Deferred
Prosecution Agreement also explicitly states that the United States
will not "seek to interfere with, revoke, or limit any licenses.""1
2
3. Settlement Agreements
On August 19, 2009, the United States and Switzerland
entered into a final settlement agreement (the "Settlement
Agreement") acknowledging the Deferred Prosecution
Agreement and mutually accepting its terms."3 The Settlement
Agreement was an opportunity for both governments to "[choose]
accommodation over confrontation, with face-saving measures for
both sides.""1
4
According to the Settlement Agreement, the IRS will
deliver a "request for administrative assistance" to the Swiss
Federal Tax Administration, in compliance with the standards of
Article 26 of the Convention for the Avoidance of Double
Taxation."5  Pursuant to the agreement, UBS will provide
information about account holders with accounts subject to the
treaty request based on a certain criteria to the Swiss Federal Tax
Administration. 6 With the help of FINMA, the Swiss Federal
110. Id. at 10.
111. Id.; see generally Neil Roland, UBS Exec Admits Bank's Sham Tax Shelters
Broke U.S. Law, FIN. WK., July 17, 2008, http://www.financialweek.com/apps/pbcs.dll/
article?AID=2008749563333 (Jacob Frenkel, a former federal criminal and SEC
prosecutor stated, "[t]he U.S. government, particularly in this economy, is not going
to blow up an international financial institution with a criminal indictment.").
112. Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 3, at 10.
113. Settlement Agreement, supra note 107, at 3.
114. David S. Hilzenrath, Swiss No Longer Shielding Biggest U.S. Tax Dodgers,
WASH. POST, Nov. 18, 2009, at A13, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2009/11/17/AR2009111701240.html.
115. Settlement Agreement, supra note 107, at 1; see Double Taxation, supra note
68.
116. Settlement Agreement, supra note 107, at 2; see, UBS to Notify Clients, supra
note 2 ("Once the Swiss Federal Tax Administration (FTA) has informed UBS that a
treaty request has been received, UBS will begin producing the information on a
rolling basis, with the first 500 account cases submitted to the FTA within 60 days and
all account cases delivered within 270 days.").
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Office of Justice will oversee UBS's compliance with the Deferred
Prosecution Agreement.17 Under the Settlement Agreement,
UBS must give notice to those U.S. citizens "whose accounts with
UBS are subject to a treaty request for information informing
them that they should promptly designate an agent in
Switzerland."' 18
The criteria used to identify which accounts will be
reported to the Swiss Federal Tax Administration were originally
confidential, according to the Settlement Agreement."9 However,
the criteria were disclosed in late November, giving UBS'sS120
American clients a greater idea of their risk of being reported.
The criteria released by the IRS indicated that "if the account met
two measures: having more than $992,802 (1 million Swiss francs)
at any time from 2001 through 2008, and generating average
annual revenue of more than 100,000 Swiss francs over three
years." ''
4. Protocol to Convention on Double Taxation
122
Originally, the Convention did not address tax evasion,
but on September 23, 2009, a protocol to the Convention was
117. Settlement Agreement, supra note 107, at 3.
118. UBS to Notify Clients, supra note 2.; see also Settlement Agreement, supra
note 107, Exhibit B (Account holders whose names are reported to the Swiss Federal
Tax Administration may appeal the decision to have their names reported, however,
it is important to note that, under 18 U.S.C. § 3506, the account holder would be
required to report this appeal process to the Attorney General of the United States);
see generally 18 U.S.C. § 3506 (2009) ("[A]ny national or resident of the United
States who submits, or causes to be submitted, a pleading or other document to a
court or other authority in a foreign country in opposition to an official request for
evidence of an offense shall serve such pleading or other document on the Attorney
General at the time such pleading or other document is submitted.").
119. Settlement Agreement, supra note 107, at 5.
120. Hilzenrath, supra note 114.
121. Id. (The agreement will also include accounts with more than 250,000 Swiss
francs "if the American depositors used an off-shore shell company to hide
ownership of the funds"); Lynnley Browning, 14,700 Disclosed Offshore Accounts,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/18/business/globalI18
irs.html [hereinafter 14,700 Disclosed] ("UBS will also disclose accounts for which
holders did not file a special disclosure document, called a W-9, over at least three
years since 1998, and for which the accounts generated annual revenue to the client
of at least 100,000 Swiss francs.").
122. Double Taxation, supra note 68, at 16.
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signed to "expand this cooperation to tax evasion as well as tax
fraud.' '123 The Protocol states that Switzerland cannot refuse to
give information to the United States because the "information is
held by a bank.' ' 124 If such a case arises, Swiss authorities "have the
power to enforce disclosure of information."' 25  This recent
development in the scope of the Convention may have the effect
of permanently allowing for American tax investigators to look
into possible tax evasion schemes taking place within Swiss
borders.
B. The IRS and Tax Evasion: The Hunt for 10,000 Names
The IRS indicated in the Settlement Agreement that it will
not stop its investigation until it has acquired the names of 10,000
126UBS customers. Under the Settlement Agreement, the IRS will
withdraw the Summons "no later than 370 days from the date of
the Settlement Agreement" or when the IRS receives information
concerning 10,000 accounts held with UBS, whichever comes
first.1 27 The 10,000 names would include the 250 to 300 names that
the IRS already received in February and any names obtained
through UBS handovers under the Settlement Agreement.' 28 The
IRS is also willing to count names obtained through its "voluntary
program,, 129 which is an IRS program separate from the
Settlement Agreement.
The IRS's voluntary disclosure program, scheduled to be in
effect for six months in connection with this investigation, initially
provided that individuals who came forward with information
regarding their offshore assets would be provided a written
123. UBS to Notify Clients, supra note 2.
124. Protocol Amending the Convention Between the Swiss Confederation and
the United States of America for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to
Taxes on Income, U.S.-Switz, Art. 3 § 5, Sept. 23, 2009, available at http://www.tax
ation.ch/File/PDF/Treaties/DBA_CHUSA-englishprotocol.pdf.
125. Id.
126. UBS Agrees to Disclose 4,450 Bank Account Names, WEBCPA.coM, Aug. 19,
2009 [hereinafter UBS Agrees to Disclose 4,450 Names], http://www.webcpa.com/
news/UBS-Agrees-Disclose-4450-Bank-Account-Names-51396-1.html.
127. Settlement Agreement, supra note 107, at 4.
128. UBS Agrees to Disclose 4,450 Names, supra note 126.
129. Id.
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guarantee to be free from criminal prosecution. " ° The IRS has
since removed this guarantee from the voluntary disclosure
program to allow more discretion in reviewing the cases due to the
increased volume of the taxpayers involved.3  Instead, those who
disclose offshore assets voluntarily are only guaranteed that the
IRS will not recommend prosecution to the DOJ.13 2 The IRS has
stated that it intends to be more forgiving towards taxpayers who
provide information regarding parties who aided the taxpayer to
113hide assets overseas. Also, the voluntary disclosure program
initially included a form with more than twenty questions,
including the account holder's motivation for evasion and who
advised the account holder to open the offshore account.' 34 The
IRS has since terminated its use of the questionnaire and, instead,
it has reserved the right to require taxpayers participating in the• • 131
voluntary disclosure program to submit to an interview.
The Commissioner of the IRS, Douglas Shulman, stated
that taxpayers who report themselves voluntarily would be
benefitted.36  These taxpayers will receive a "fair settlement"
requiring that they pay back-taxes and interest for six years,
"either an accuracy or delinquency penalty on all six years," and
''a penalty of [twenty] percent of the amount in the foreign bank
130. Roger Russell, IRS has Deal for Offshore Evaders, WEBCPA.CoM, May 4,
2009, http://www.webcpa.com/atoissues/2009_7/-50170-1.html. See Statement from
IRS Commissioner Doug Shulman on Offshore Income, March 26, 2009,
http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=206014,00.html [hereinafter Shulman
Statement]; Voluntary Disclosure: Questions and Answers, last updated Aug. 25,
2009, http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=210027,00.html [hereinafter
Disclosure Q&A] (the IRS' voluntary disclosure program, which has been in place
for years, allows persons with offshore bank accounts to come forward and admit to
tax evasion to potentially avoid criminal prosecution).
131. See Michael Cohn, IRS Revises Voluntary Disclosure Info, WEBCPA.COM,
July 30, 2009, http://www.webcpa.com/debits-credits/IRS-Revises-Voluntary-Disclo
sure-Info-51192-1.html.
132. See id.
133. Russell, supra note 130 (explaining that the presumed benefit of this
information to the IRS is that it could contact the adviser to obtain the names of the
adviser's other clients with offshore assets).
134. Id.
135. Disclosure Q&A, supra note 130 (noting that optional format letter is a viable
method of disclosure).
136. See Shulman Statement, supra note 130 (explaining that those who come in
purely voluntarily can potentially escape a criminal prosecution).
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accounts in the year with the highest aggregate account or asset
value."137
So far, the IRS has reported that more than 14,700
Americans have turned themselves in under the voluntary
disclosure program.138  The IRS Commissioner was pleased,
stating, "[w]e are talking about billions of dollars coming into the
U.S. Treasury.', 139  The IRS Commissioner indicated that this
influx of information will not affect UBS's duty to hand over the
4,450 account names and that UBS had already selected 500
account names.' 4° While the voluntary disclosure of 10,000
accounts would trigger the withdrawal of the John Doe Summons,
10,000 UBS clients coming forward would "ha[ve] nothing to do
with the obligation that the Swiss have taken to the U.S.
government to produce 4,450 account names.'
41
V. THE IMPACT OF WEAKENED Swiss BANK SECRECY
This Part will examine the effects of the information
exchange treaties discussed above and the recent agreement
between UBS and the DOJ on the strength of Swiss secrecy laws.
Further, this Part will expand on the potential harm to the Swiss
banking industry and how these changes will impact American
customers.
A. Impact on the Swiss Banking Industry
The settlement agreements between the United States and
Switzerland and the United States and UBS, along with the
amendment to the Convention to expand cooperation by the Swiss
government in cases of tax evasion, demonstrates a decided shift
from protecting the individual privacy of bank investors to a more
cooperative attitude for sharing information with other countries
undertaking various tax fraud or evasion investigations. While
137. Id.




142. See Cantley, supra note 71.
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this cooperation will likely improve Switzerland's international
reputation, it is problematic on two fronts. First, critics point to
the fact that tax law is a domestic issue and "Swiss laws and
national sovereignty should be respected.' ' 143  International
pressure on a nation to change the interpretation of its bank
secrecy laws has the negative impact of interfering with state
sovereignty.
Second, the Swiss banking industry could suffer if the
interpretation of the secrecy laws is dramatically weakened.' 44 A
great concern for Swiss banks is a potential loss of clients' faith.45
If current or potential clients do not have faith in the application
of Swiss secrecy laws, they could be discouraged from investing
with Swiss banks.' International investors now know that if they
wish to keep their assets hidden, they should transfer their funds to
another offshore tax haven with strict secrecy laws that have not
147been diluted by international pressure.
Switzerland is in a corporate catch-22 with regards to the
UBS investigation. If UBS fails to comply with criminal
investigations it runs the risk of failure as the threat of criminal
prosecution against it for noncompliance may be fatal to a
corporation.'" Instead, if UBS complies with the investigation, it
143. Brabec, supra note 52, at 259.
144. Id. at 238.
145. See Moser, supra note 70.
146. See id.
147. Id. at 354.
148. See Thomasson, supra note 17; Swiss Bank Settles U.S. Tax Charges,
Mounting U.S. Pressure on Swiss Bank Secrecy, 103 AM. J. INT'L L. 338, 338 (Jon R.
Crook ed., 2009) (explaining that criminal charges such as these "often are fatal to
corporations"); see generally, Luisa Beltran et al., Andersen Guilty, Once Grand
Accounting Firm Now Faces Five Years Probation, $500,000 Fine and Possibly Its
Own End, CNNMONEY.COM, Jun. 16, 2002, http://money.cnn.com/2002/06/13/news/
andersenverdict/index.htm (after eighty nine years as a successful accounting firm,
Arthur Andersen was prosecuted and convicted by the U.S. government); Bill Mears,
et al., Andersen Conviction Overturned, CNNMONEY.COM, May 31, 2005, http://
money.cnn.com/2005/05/31/news/midcaps/scandal-andersen-scotus/index.htm
(explaining that even though the conviction was overturned, the conviction itself had
almost forced the firm out of business while the indictment had caused 28,000 people
to lose their jobs at that time); Charles Lane, Justices Overturn Andersen Conviction,
WASH. POST, Jun. 1, 2005, at Al; see e.g., End to Defiance, supra note 29 (KPMG
entered into a settlement agreement with the DOJ in order to avoid a "potentially
fatal indictment and ...the fate of Arthur Andersen, the accounting firm that
collapsed after prosecutors charged it with obstruction of justice." KPMG entered
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could suffer a significant loss of business as UBS loses the
advantage it could provide wealthy Americans.49
The Swiss government cannot afford UBS's failure
resulting from either a criminal prosecution or a loss of business.5
In 2008, UBS managed more than $2.8 trillion worth of assets,"'
and UBS's annual revenue was more than $117 billion. 52
Switzerland's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was $321.9 billion in
2008.153
Moreover, the successful attack on Swiss bank secrecy
could "encourage tax authorities in other jurisdictions to pursue a
similar strategy. '',5 4 This could lead to more criminal prosecutions
against Swiss banks and a loss of other foreign clients.' For
example, following the agreement between Switzerland and the
United States, France entered into a treaty with Switzerland
providing the French government easier access to information
regarding French citizens with money hidden in Switzerland. 56
France took steps to warn tax evaders that it had acquired a list of
into this agreement because it "realized that its defiance was threatening its
existence.").
149. Brabec, supra note 52, at 238 (explaining that the "trust and loyalty" that
Switzerland has shown to its clients over time is the foundation of the Swiss banking
industry's "competitive edge").
150. See Update 3 - UBS Falls After Swiss Minister Comments on U.S. Row,
REUTERS, Feb. 1, 2010, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSLDE6100DY20100201
[hereinafter UBS Falls] ("The stability of UBS ... is vital to Switzerland as the bank's
liabilities are worth several times the country's gross domestic product.").
151. U.S. TAX COMPLIANCE, supra note 1
152. Fortune Global 500, Annual Ranking of World's Largest Corporations for
2008, http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/global500/2008/snapshots/7652.html
(last visited Feb. 6, 2010).
153. CIA World Factbook, Europe: Switzerland, https://www.cia.gov/library/
publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sz.html (last updated on Jan. 15, 2010) UBS'
annual revenue represents about thirty-six percent of Switzerland's GDP. Compare
id (noting Swiss GDP of $321.9 billion), with Fortune Global 500, supra note 152
(noting UBS annual revenue at 117.2 billion).
154. Lisa Jucca, UBS Tax Deal is Swiss Bank Secrecy's Waterloo, REUTERS, Feb.
20, 2009, http://uk.reuters.com/article/idUKLNE5110OM20090220.
155. See Carolin Schober, Will Swiss Banks Have to Reinvent Themselves?, CNBC,
Aug. 24,2009, http://www.cnbc.com/id/32506536/site/140811545.
156. See, Peggy Hollinger, Tax Evaders' Bank Secrecy 'Rolled Back,' FIN. TIMES,
Aug. 30, 2009, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/7a4c8ddO-958d-llde-90e0-OOl44feabdcO,sOl
=1.html.
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3,000 citizens' names with a combined three billion Euros
deposited in Swiss bank accounts.'57
Some believe that the Swiss banking industry may be able
to withstand the harm caused by this scandal and the UBS deal.
As one analyst noted, "Swiss banks will always be able to use the
economic and political stability of Switzerland as their unique
selling point.' 58 One Swiss banker commented that "the strength
in Swiss banking is in corporate, not private, banking"; therefore, a
decrease in the amount of private investors would not have a great
effect on the banking sector. 59
B. What This Means for American Clients
The Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act, recently re-introduced in
the Senate by Senator Carl Levin, "would allow the United States
to bar banks in this country from doing business with foreign
banks that refused to cooperate with American tax authorities.
' 6
In 2008, Senator Levin lobbied for the revocation of UBS's
bank license.16 ' The United States may still call for such a drastic
move if authorities find that UBS is "one of the main culprits for
the significant loss of tax revenues.' ' 62 Nevertheless, given the size
and stature of UBS the United States is not likely to revoke UBS's
157. Id.
158. Schober, supra note 155.
159. Moser, supra note 70, at 354.
160. See Editorial, $100 Billion the Country Could Use, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2009,
at A20; Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act, S. 506; 111th Cong. §104(a)(2009) ("[Iun which
the particular person or ascertainable group or class of persons have financial
accounts in or transactions related to offshore secrecy jurisdictions, there shall be a
presumption that there is a reasonable basis for believing" that the person or group
has not complied with the internal revenue law). The bill would increase the amount
of time authorities have to conduct investigations to within six years of when the tax
return was filed. Id.; see, e.g., UBS Refuses to Disclose Tax Shelter Accounts, supra
note 41; see generally Russell, supra note 130 (explaining that this Act will likely
become legislation because President Obama was one of the original co-sponsors of
the bill during his time as an Illinois senator).
161. Levin Calls for Closing Down UBS, WEBCPA.coM, Jul. 17, 2008,
http://www.webcpa.com/news/28468-1.html [hereinafter Closing Down UBS].
162. David Stevenson, UBS Forced to Name US Tax Evaders, INT'L TAX REV.,
Dec. 9, 2008, http://www.internationaltaxreview.com/?Page=9& PUBID=210&ISS=
25204&SID=715235.
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banking license.163 Instead, the United States may sanction Swiss
banks for failing to provide the SEC with sufficient information.'
64
A potentially devastating implication of this Act165 would
occur if foreign banks decide not to do business with American
customers.' 66 During a 2007 hearing held by the Senate Permanent
Subcommittee on Investigations looking into the actions of
offshore tax havens, an executive at UBS stated that it would no
longer offer offshore banking to residents of the United States.' 67
This assertion has, in fact, come to fruition, as part of the Deferred
Prosecution Agreement through which UBS has agreed that it will
only do business with American customers through U.S. registered
subsidiaries or affiliates79
VI. RECENT DEVELOPMENT
A. Swiss Court Makes a Ruling
On January 22, 2010, a Swiss court panel reviewing an
appeal by a UBS client ruled that "UBS AG files on private-bank
clients shouldn't be turned over to U.S. authorities" because "the
failure to file a W-9 form wasn't considered fraud in
Switzerland."1 69 This is the first Swiss ruling since UBS agreed to
163. Id. The Justice Minister Widmer-Schlumpf stated that Switzerland is aware
that "the Swiss economy and the job market would suffer on a major scale should
UBS fail as a result of its license being revoked ... ." UBS Falls, supra note 150.
164. E.g. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Banca Della Svizzera Italiana, 92 F.R.D. 111, 32
Fed. R. Serv. 2d 1650 (1981) ("[A] party who had made deliberate use of foreign law
to evade American law might be subject to sanctions.").
165. Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act, S. 506; 111th Cong. §104(a)(2009).
166. See, e.g., Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 3, at Exhibit D (letter
from UBS to its American clients terminating the business relationship).
167. See supra p. 449; Closing Down UBS, supra note 161; see generally U.S.
Cracks Down on Tax Havens, WEBCPA.cOM, Dec. 4, 2008, http://www.web
cpa.com/news/30017-1.html (regarding similar instances of tax haven abuse in
Liechtenstein).
168. See Deferred Prosecution Agreement supra note 3, at 4 (section explains
"Permanent Restrictions On and Elevated Standards for UBS's United States Cross-
Border Business"). See generally id., at Exhibit D (information letter regarding
termination of business relationship with UBS AG sent to American clients).
169. Carrick Mollenkamp & Laura Saunders, Swiss Court Muddles UBS
Settlement With U.S., WALL ST. J., Jan. 23, 2010, at B1, available at http://online.
wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704509704575018981732771318.html. The decision
was decided upon "an arcane distinction between tax evasion and tax fraud." Haig
Simonian, Swiss in Bid to Save Bank Secrecy Deal, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 24, 2010,
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disclose 4,450 account names.17  While the ruling only directly
affects the client 7' who filed the appeal,172 the decision may have
broader implications, including potentially invalidating the 2009
Settlement Agreement. 7' By effectively declaring the Settlement
Agreement to be illegal, the court created an uncomfortable
dilemma for the Swiss government.74 Because the decision came
from a federal court and may not be appealed, the Swiss
government has few remedial options to ensure compliance with
the agreement and avoid a criminal indictment against UBS. 7'
The Swiss government must uphold its obligation to the United
176States without violating this decision, or it risks the possibility
that giving in to U.S. demands could "trigger a dangerous domestic
backlash."1
7
The IRS responded to this decision by affirming that it
"believed the Swiss government would continue to honor the
agreement.' '7  The IRS's optimism could stem from the fact that
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/7b5fe9dc-0929-1 ldf-ba88-00144feabdcO.html [hereinafter,
Swiss in Bid]. See Daniel Pruzin, Latest Court Ruling on UBS Case Poses Dilemma
for Swiss Government, BNA BANKING DAILY, Jan. 26, 2010, available at 1/26/2010
BBD d23 (Westlaw) [hereinafter UBS Case Poses Dilemma].
170. Mollenkamp & Saunders, supra note 169. A separate Swiss court decision
issued on January 8, 2010, declared the February 2009 deal to provide 250 to 300
client names to be illegal, however FINMA has indicated it will appeal this decision.
Justin Hine et al., Cabinet Wants More Talks With US Over UBS Data,
SWISSINFO.CH, Jan. 27, 2010, http://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/Specials/Swiss-banking_
secrecy-underjfire/News/Cabinet wantsmoretalks withUS overUBSdata.html
?cid=8177522 [hereinafter Cabinet Wants More Talks].
171. The appeal was brought on behalf of an unidentified female millionaire from
the United States. Swiss in Bid, supra note 169.
172. The court declared this decision to be a "test case" that would apply to "an
additional 25 appeals." UBS Case Poses Dilemma, supra note 169 ("The SFTA was
required to make decisions on 500 accounts by the end of November 2009, meaning
holders of the remaining 475 accounts decided not to appeal. These account holders
may now request an exceptional right to file an appeal in light of the court's ruling.").
173. See Lynnley Browning, Swiss Ruling Jeopardizes Deal for UBS Clients'
Names, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2010, at B2, available at 2010 WLNR 1466926
(explaining that this ruling also has the potential to "jeopardize" the February 2009
agreement to pay $780 million and provide 250 account names) [hereinafter Ruling
Jeopardizes Deal].
174. UBS Case Poses Dilemma, supra note 169.
175. Id.
176. See id.
177. Paul Betts, Swiss Government Faces Uncomfortable U.S. Dilemma, FIN.
TIMES, Jan. 26, 2010, at 22, available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/c359d81a-0a19-
lldf-8b23-00144feab dc0.html.
178. Mollenkamp & Saunders, supra note 169.
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the decision only covers certain client accounts'" and not "other
cases such as UBS clients setting up shell companies . . . those
engaged in a 'scheme of lies,' or those submitting incorrect or false
documents to conceal assets or underreport income."18" The
decision could effectively mean, however, that Switzerland will not
be able to comply with more than ninety percent of cases.'81
Nevertheless, many analysts believe that Switzerland will
cooperate with U.S. tax authorities given the difficulty involved in
reaching the agreement. 18 2  Jeffrey Neiman, Assistant U.S.
Attorney from the Southern District of Florida insisted that "the
United States, Switzerland, and Swiss banking giant UBS will
continue to work together to ensure that information about U.S.
investors with UBS accounts still will be turned over to the [IRS]
despite adverse rulings in the Swiss courts."'8 3 The IRS continued
to express its confidence that the Swiss would honor the
agreement after the Swiss Cabinet met on January 27, 2010 to
discuss Switzerland's options.18'
B. Options Available to the Swiss
Following this most recent court ruling, the Swiss
essentially have four choices: (1) refuse to comply in hopes that
the United States will be satisfied with the account information it
has already achieved through the voluntary disclosure program;
(2) employ "retrospective application of the June 2009 revised
double taxation agreement to cover the 4,450 accounts;" (3)
179. UBS Case Poses Dilemma, supra note 169.
180. Id.
181. Jason Rhodes, Swiss Government Confident It Can Save UBS Tax Deal,
REUTERS, Jan. 27, 2010, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE60Q3BA20100127
[hereinafter Swiss Government Confident]. See also UBS Case Poses Dilemma, supra
note 169 ("[T]he majority of the 4,450 targeted accounts-perhaps up to two-thirds-
are likely to be affected by the ruling").
182. See Alison Bennett, Parties to Continue Work on UBS Agreement as
Prosecutors Focus on Hidden U.S. Assets, BNA BANKING DAILY, Jan. 27, 2010,
available at 1/27/2010 BBD d15 (Westlaw).
183. Id.
184. See Daniel Pruzin, Switzerland for Now to Hand Over Data on Only 250
Secret Accounts with UBS, BNA BANKING DAILY, Jan. 28, 2010, available at
1/28/2010 BBD d31 (Westlaw) [hereinafter Only 250 Secret Accounts].
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"secure immediate parliamentary approval of the Aug. 19
agreement;" or (4) adopt an "emergency law." 185
1. Failure to Comply with the Agreement
The Swiss will most likely comply with the agreement,
though they may expect some modifications to the Settlement
Agreement. 1 6 Justice Minister Eveline Widmer-Schlumpf stated
that the Swiss Cabinet decided to try to find a "new solution" and
present "[a more] 'appropriate' agreement with the United States
to [Swiss] parliament for approval., 187  The Swiss are willing to
''renegotiate" in an effort to "seek a way to salvage the
agreement."' 8 The Justice Minister said, however, that she would
not "rule out 'formal or material changes to the treaty,' which
America has been touting as a triumph in its crackdown on tax
fraud." 189 UBS has also issued a statement indicating that it "will
fulfill all [of their] commitments under the agreement.'1 While
Swiss officials want the United States to know that they take this
problem seriously, it has demands of its own, according to a law
professor in Bern.91
185. UBS Case Poses Dilemma, supra note 169.
186. See Cabinet Wants More Talks, supra note 170.
187. Id. (emphasizing in her statement that Switzerland would "discuss with the
US authorities right away" how to best supply the client information to U.S. tax
authorities).
188. Frank Jordans, Court Forces Swiss Rethink in UBS Tax Deal with US,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Jan. 27, 2010, available at http://hosted.ap.org/dynamic/stories/
E/EU SWITZERLANDUBSTAXEVASION?SITE=AP&SECTION=HOME&
TEMPLATE=DEFAULT&CTIME=2010-01-27-13-12-47 [hereinafter Court Forces
Swiss Rethink].
189. Christine Seib, Swiss Aim to Renegotiate Tax Pact with US to Avoid
Referendum, TIMES (LONDON), Jan. 28, 2010, at A57, available at http://business.times
online.co.uk/ tol/business/markets/europe/article7005390.ece.
190. Court Forces Swiss Rethink, supra note 188. While UBS wishes to be
cooperative, it has indicated, however, that it will not break secrecy laws without
governmental approval and hand over client information illegally by violating bank
secrecy as some politicians had encouraged. See Sven Egenter, UBS Says Swiss Govt
Must Save U.S. Tax Deal, REUTERS, Jan. 27, 2010, http://www.reuters.com/
article/idUSTRE60Q1BW20100127.
191. Joseph Heaven et al., Swiss Will Work With U.S. to Save UBS Tax Agreement
(Update 4), BLOOMBERG, Jan. 27, 2010, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid
=20670001&sid=ajAwOXtvz4HY (indicating that the Swiss are struggling to find a
solution).
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The Swiss Cabinet has already indicated that it will comply
with the Settlement Agreement if the IRS provides the number of
UBS clients that were among the 14,700 voluntary disclosure
participants. 92  The Swiss are interested in this information
because the Settlement Agreement contains provisions requiring
the IRS to withdraw the John Doe summons if it received
information on 10,000 UBS accounts, including information
obtained from voluntary disclosures.193 Thus, if the IRS has
received a sufficient number of UBS client account names to date,
the agency must revoke the John Doe summons. 94 Potentially a
"large number" of the disclosed accounts belong to UBS.' 9'
If Switzerland does fail to comply with the agreement, the
United States could return to court to "enforce its original
summons request.0 19 6  One U.S. tax attorney explained that
Switzerland's failure or inability to comply with the agreement
could lead the IRS and DOJ to find "some way to reopen [the
original] case and pursue more stringent enforcement., 19 7 This
outcome is most certainly undesirable for UBS and Switzerland as
a whole.198 The possibility of modification of the Settlement
Agreement coupled with the threat of legal action make it likely
that the Swiss will comply with their obligations under the
agreement in some fashion.
2. Retrospective Application of a June 2009 Agreement
In order to respond to the court's decision, the Swiss may
choose to apply retroactively the June 2009 agreement, 99 a
"revised Swiss-U.S. bilateral tax agreement" that provided for
192. Lynnley Browning, Swiss Back Away From Deal to Give Names of Rich UBS
Clients to U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2010, at B3, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2010/01.28/business/global/28ubs.html [hereinafter Swiss Back Away]. As of
February 1, 2010, the IRS has declined to disclose how many of the accounts were
UBS clients. UBS Falls, supra note 150.
193. See supra p. 454; Only 250 Secret Accounts with UBS, supra note 184.
194. See id.
195. Id.
196. Swiss Government Confident, supra note 181.
197. Ruling Jeopardizes Deal, supra note 173.
198. See Cabinet Wants More Talks, supra note 170.
199. See UBS Case Poses Dilemma, supra note 169.
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greater administrative information exchange in instances of tax
evasion in addition to tax fraud.2 ° This agreement did not receive
parliamentary ratification prior to the court ruling.0 While
retroactive ratification would solve the problem of enforcing the
Settlement Agreement, the June 2009 agreement may be "contrary
to the rule of law, 20 2 because it broadens administrative assistance
in tax matters to include tax evasion, which is not a crime in
Switzerland .2  This agreement will be presented to the Swiss
Parliament for a first reading in March, 2010.205
3. Parliamentary Approval of the Settlement Agreement
Instead of implementing the June 2009 agreement, the
Swiss Parliament may approve the original Settlement Agreement,
providing a stronger legal foundation for the implementation of
information exchange between Switzerland and the United
States.6 Parliamentary approval would "convert the agreement
into a binding treaty rather than the more informal
'understanding,' which would then take precedence over the 1996
treaty., 207 This option provides a substantial benefit to the Swiss
because it allows the Swiss to meet the deadlines required by the
Settlement Agreement.20° While Parliamentary approval is a
better legal option than the retrospective application of the June
2009 agreement, it may give rise to greater political controversy.2 09
The primary issue raised is "whether even parliament could
legitimately hand over the information, 210 and opponents of the
approval may lobby for a "national referendum to challenge the
200. Id.; Only 250 Secret Accounts, supra note 184.
201. UBS Case Poses Dilemma, supra note 169.
202. Id.
203. Only 250 Secret Accounts, supra note 184.
204. See supra pp. 444 and 448.
205. Only 250 Secret Accounts, supra note 184.
206. UBS Case Poses Dilemma, supra note 169.
207. Only 250 Secret Accounts, supra note 184 (explaining that this option was
actually suggested by the court who made the ruling).
208. Id.
209. UBS Case Poses Dilemma, supra note 169.
210. Cabinet Wants More Talks, supra note 170.
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Parliament's decision. 21 1 Justice Minister Widmer-Schlumpf
explained that Parliament would address the issue of whether to
hold a referendum,2 2 while the Swiss Federal Council did not think
that a referendum would be necessary.1 The Justice Minister
explained, however, that "legislators could 'decide for political
reasons' to put the issue on a national ballot., 214  Putting this
decision to a national referendum could present an additional
obstacle to attempts to enforce the agreement because polls have
"suggest[ed] that Swiss citizens would not approve a loosening of
banking secrecy laws.
2 15
4. Adoption of an Emergency Law
The final option available to the Swiss is for that the
Federal Council to adopt an emergency law enforcing the
agreement regardless of any inconsistency with current Swiss
law.1 6 An emergency law would mean a removal of bank secrecy
laws in special cases.2" Nevertheless, Justice Minister Widmer-
Schlumpf argued that passing an emergency law is not a viable
option 21 because passing emergency legislation would change
Swiss bank secrecy laws. 219 She promised that Switzerland would
"do what it could 2 0 to comply without affecting bank secrecy.
221
Furthermore, the adoption of an emergency law would be "highly
controversial politically" as it has not been used since World War
211. UBS Case Poses Dilemma, supra note 169.
212. Cabinet Wants More Talks, supra note 170.
213. Only 250 Secret Accounts, supra note 184.
214. Cabinet Wants More Talks, supra note 170.
215. Seib, supra note 189.
216. See UBS Case Poses Dilemma, supra note 169.
217. Jason Rhodes, Preview-Swiss Government to Discuss UBS Tax Deal,
REUTERS, Jan. 26, 2010, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSLDE60P1HP201001226.
218. Court Forces Swiss Rethink, supra note 188.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. See supra p. 462 and note 196.
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11.222 Coincidentally, the last time the Swiss invoked an emergency
223law was to create the banking secrecy laws during the Nazi era..
C. What the Swiss Are Willing to Disclose
The Swiss Cabinet announced that it will not contest the
February disclosure agreement to provide 250 UBS client accounts
to the DOJ, as a refusal to do so could damage both UBS and the
world's economy.224 The Cabinet distinguished those names from
the 4,450 names in the August settlement, which would be illegal
to disclose.225 As of late January, six accounts had been disclosed
to the United States; however, those disclosures were made after
the clients provided written requests to Swiss authorities to send
information. 226 The Justice Minister indicated that the Swiss will
not disclose any more account information "until the legal and
political issues are resolved., 227 Underscoring the significance of
future Swiss action, the Justice Minister stated that any decision
regarding its agreement with the United States "will affect not just
the future of UBS but 'also the stability of the financial center and
the economic situation of Switzerland.'
228
VII. CONCLUSION
The erosion of Swiss secrecy could create vulnerability for
the Swiss banking industry and impact American investors. The
Swiss banking industry is already weak due to the current financial• • 229
crisis. Another blow could cause irreparable harm and a
222. UBS Case Poses Dilemma, supra note 169 (explaining that the Parliament
enacted an emergency law to allow the Federal Council to "ensure Switzerland's
independence and security").
223. See supra pp. 442-43.
224. Swiss Back Away, supra note 192.
225. See id.
226. Only 250 Secret Accounts, supra note 184.
227. Heaven et al., supra note 191.
228. Court Forces Swiss Rethink, supra note 188. This statement is further
supported by the fact that, after the Justice Minister highlighted this fact, UBS shares
dropped by 0.9 percent to an all time low since July 2009. UBS Falls, supra note 150.
229. UBS has apparently "stabilized its financial situation," however, "it needs to
resolve the U.S. dispute to win back wealthy clients." UBS Falls, supra note 150.
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potential collapse of the Swiss banking industry.2 0 The Swiss
banking industry as a whole could withstand this situation,
however, because of both the Swiss banks' strong foundations and
Switzerland's international reputation for stability.3
As far as American clients are concerned, UBS has already
created and begun to implement their Exit Program and will no
232longer offer offshore services to American residents. It may only
be a matter of time before other Swiss banks, and perhaps other
tax haven nations seeking to avoid this kind of an attack will stop
offering services to U.S. citizens.
American clients are faced with a choice. They can transfer
assets to different tax havens, prolonging the apparently inevitable
closing of international tax haven loopholes. Alternatively,
Americans can come forward through the IRS's voluntary
disclosure program.2 4 This second option provides customers with
the soundest protection since the days of unrestricted offshore tax
havens that are not subject to scrutiny are dwindling. Kenneth
Rubinstein, a wealth management lawyer in New York has stated
that he has encouraged his clients to come forward to the IRS
"despite the delay in handing over the names." 235 Thus, disclosure
may be the best option for Americans with assets offshore.236
As access to offshore tax havens depletes and more
Americans come forward to disclose their offshore assets, the
United States could see an increase in tax revenues. This story will
evolve at least until the Swiss make a final decision.
CAROLYN B. LOVEJOY
230. See id.
231. See Schober, supra note 155.
232. See supra p. 449 and note 109.
233. Bennett, supra note 182 (quoting Assistant U.S. Attorney Jeffrey Neiman as
saying "this is going to go well beyond UBS and UBS taxpayers. It is not a question
of if, it's a question of when.").
234. See supra pp. 452-54.
235. Seib, supra note 189. Mr. Rubinstein is quoted saying, "I'd say: 'Don't be so
sure [the Swiss Government's] not going to cave in. They caved in the first time."' Id.
236. See supra p. 453; Disclosure Q&A, supra note 130.
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